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Keiretsu: Their Effect on Business and
How American Government and Business
Can Confront Them

While recent reports indicate an increasing tolerance of
foreign companies doing business in Japan,' substantial obstacles still exist.' One of the most difficult aspects of doing business in Japan is competing with the well-established system of
keiretsu3 which permeates the Japanese business world. Simply defined, keiretsu are networks or families of corporations
that have interlocking interests in one another.' Keiretsu primarily affect foreign and local companies competing in the
Japanese market, but they also have a secondary effect on U.S.
companies competing with keiretsu-affiliated Japanese companies operating in the United States. For many "foreigners trying to do business in Japan, [keiretsu] have become the symbol,
and source, of the country's most exclusionary practices.'"
This comment examines the effects of keiretsu on business
in Japan and America. It also explores approaches American
government and business can take to confront keiretsu. Section
I1 of this comment begins with a brief overview, summarizing
the origins of keiretsu and defining its different types. Section

1. According to a report given to the American Chamber of Commerce in J a pan (ACCJ), "[tlhe environment for U.S. trade and investment in Japan has significantly improved in the last five to 10 years." Green Light Seen for Trade, JAPAN
TIMES,
June 12, 1991, available in Nikkei Database. Also, "[iln an extensive study
done in early 1991 by the ACCJ and the global management consulting firm A.T.
Kearney International Inc., . . . some 55 percent of respondents said the climate
for investment had improved over the last five years." Trade, Investment Clinate
Has Improved, Survey Finds, INTI BUS. DAILY(BNA), Aug. 29, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAITD File [hereinafter Survey].
2.
"Among the main obstacles listed were the high cost of doing business in
Japan, the dificulty in finding qualified personnel, the multi-tiered distribution
system, the interlocking business and ownership relationships known as keiretsu,
and government ministry guidelines, policies, and regulations." Survey, supra note
1 (italics added).
3.
Keiretsu is both singular and plural, and is pronounced kfi're-tsoo.
4.
Interlocking Ties Among Companies Criticized, NIKKEIWKLY., July 27, 1991,
a t 8.
5.
Inside the Charmed Circle, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 5, 1991, at 54, 54.

1156 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992

I11 examines the benefits and costs of keiretsu. Section IV analyzes various strategies American government and business can
employ to deal with keiretsu. Section V concludes that imitation
of the keiretsu system, coupled with reforms in federal corporate law, may be the best choice for the United States.

A. Origins of Keiretsu
After World War 11, keiretsu grew out of the dismantled
z a i b a t ~ uwhich
,~
were huge banking families that, during the
nineteenth century, were "closed, monolithic superstructures
tightly held together by a single holding company."7 The
zaibatsu built themselves into huge industrial combines, controlling everything from mining to manufacturing. The zaibatsu
were a concentrated source of power in Japan and "became the
driving force of Japanese militarism" in the 1930s.'
Because the Allied Powers saw the enormous power of the
zaibatsu as "a hinderance to democracy,"g General MacArthur
and the occupation forces attempted to dismantle them.''
However, in the early 19509, after the American occupation
forces left Japan and tacitly allowed the Japanese government
to relax restrictions, many of the zaibatsu companies began to
renew their former alliances, albeit this time in a more loosely
affiliated and diversified form." In fact, "[tlhree of the big six
horizontal keiretsu were formed in the 1950s out of the pieces
of the . . . zaibatsu."12
One of the reasons these companies regrouped was the
Tokyo capital market's inability to raise capital in the early
postwar years. According to Kermit Schoenholtz, a senior econ6.
I t has even been suggested that keiretsu "have roots in the ancient relationship between feudal landlords . . . and their samurai." Michael Kinsley,
Keiretsuphobia, NEW REPUBLIC,July 1, 1991, at 4, 4.
7.
DANIELI. OKIMOTO, BETWEENMITI AND THE MARKET:
JAPANESE
INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY
133 (1989).
8. Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, a t 54.
9.
MacNeil l k h r e r Newshour: Focus-Keiretsu
(WNET television broadcast,
Sept. 19, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MACLEH File [hereinafter
MacNeil l k h r e r Newshour].
10.
Kinsley, supra note 6, at 4.
11. Insick the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, a t 54.
12.
Carla Rapoport, Why Japan Keeps on Winning, FORTUNE,July 15, 1991, a t
76, 77 (italics added). The other three have formed around major banks-Fuyo,
DKB, and Sanwa. Many members of these keiretsu also have roots in the nineteenth century. Id.
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omist a t the Tokyo branch of Salomon Brothers, "companies
that wanted to expand" had to join groups to raise capital.13
By gathering around a bank, keiretsu companies were able to
obtain investment capital a t a lower rate in exchange for entering into the group relationship. With the expansion of the capital market in Japan, keiretsu have lost much of their initial
appeal, "[blut Schoenholtz does not believe that [they] will
disappear overnight just because the financial conditions have
~hanged."'~Indeed, as explained below, companies affiliated
with a keiretsu are under intense pressure to remain loyal.
One of the obstacles the former zaibatsu companies had to
overcome when regrouping into their current keiretsu was the
prohibition against companies buying their own shares. To
avoid this problem, companies engaged in "a form of corporate
blood brotherhood called cross-~hareholding."'~Under this system, member companies own shares in other member companies. Currently, "[als much a s 25% of some companies is held
by other members of a keiretsu ."I6 This interdependent ownership alliance, while within the laws established by the occupation forces, serves much the same function as the former
zaibatsu. The keiretsu companies are tied together through
their cross-holdings, and "[slhareholders expect business, not
dividends, to flow from their investment."17

B. Types of Keiretsu
Precisely defining keiretsu1' is difficult because the term
encompasses a number of different types of corporate alliances.
However, "keiretsu are characterized by the presence of a dominant firm which organizes and partially finances the other
associated companies, 'extensive intra-keiretsu stockholding,'
and frequent purchases of intermediate goods from other
Charles Smith, Reform Runs into Resistance, FAR E. ECON.REV., June 21,
13.
1990, a t 50, 54.
Id.
14.
15.
Rapoport, supra note 12, at 85.
Id.
16.
17.
Id.
18.
The first of the two Chinese characters used to represent the word kiretsu
means system, lineage, faction, group, zone, corollary, connection. The second character means row, rank, tier, file, column, line, procession, queue. Together, they
mean order, succession. ANDREW N. NELSON,THE MODERNREADER'SJAPANESEENGLISHCHARACTER
DICTIONARY
89, 521 (2d rev. ed. 1974). However, when used
in a business setting, the word keiretsu does not have an English equivalent, so
the Japanese word has been imported.
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keiretsu members."lg Many of the current keiretsu are "based
on either prewar [industrial] conglomerates (zaibatsu), financial
~~
keiretsu groups are
ties . . . or vertical i n t e g r a t i ~ n . "These
not closed or tightly held. Rather, they are "a loosely knit, permeable set of industrial networks, connected through cross-cutting linkages?'
Keiretsu are divided into two types: horizontal and vertical.22 Horizontal keiretsu are usually organized around a bank
and consist of a variety of companies that perform different
functions. Mitsubishi is an example of a horizontal keiretsu.23
"Corporate membership in a [horizontal] keiretsu . . . usually
involves heavy reliance on the main keiretsu bank for debt
financing, and extensive intra-keiretsu stock holding^."^^ Vertical keiretsu, on the other hand, are "composed of a major industrial corporation and its suppliers in a particular industry.7725
These vertical keiretsu are "held together by fairly predictable
transaction patterns and based on implicit long-term contracts,
financing, and equity ownership."26 The Toyota keiretsu is a n
example of a vertical keiretsu, dominating its family of parts
manufacturers and suppliers.27
19.
Steven R. Englund, Book Note, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1232, 1234 (1988) (reINDUSTRIES:
LESSONSAND LIMITATIONS
OF INviewing JAPAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY
D U ~ I A LPOLICY (Hugh Patrick ed., 1986)) (footnotes omitted).
OKIMOTQ,supra note 7, a t 132-33.
20.
21.
Id. a t 133.
I n both types of keiretsu, member companies own some of the others' stock
22.
and "Itlop executives of the group's main bank or trading company have seats on
other members' boards." Rapoport, supra note 12, a t 77. Many Americans would
call this collusion, but to the Japanese, this system of business alliances and longterm relationships is the keiretsu system that marks Japan's special brand of capitalism and is the reason Japan has come to dominate international markets. Id. a t
76. Keninchi Imai, an industrial-policy expert a t Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo,
provides a more detailed breakdown of these two main classes of keiretsu in Insidt!
the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, at 54.
23.
The Mitsubishi keiretsu has member companies in such diverse fields as
financial services, computers and electronics, automobiles, food and beverages, construction, metals, real estate, oil and coal, rubber and glass, chemicals, fibers and
textiles, pulp and paper, industrial equipment, cameras and optics, and shipping
and transportation. See Rapport, supra note 12, a t 81.
24.
Daniel I. Okimoto, Regime Characteristics of Japanese Industrial Policy, in
JAPAN'S HIGH TJXHNOLOGYINDUSTRIES: LESSONSAND LIM~ATIONS
OF INDUSTRIAL
PoLICN 35, 47 (Hugh Patrick ed., 1986).
25.
Kinsley, supm note 6, at 4.
26.
Okimoto, supra note 24, at 46.
27.
Toyota owns 1Wo of Koito Manufacturing, its headlight provider; 41.4% of
Toyoda Gosay, its rubber manufacturer; 14% of Fubata International, a muMer
manufacturer; and so on through its entire group of suppliers. Each of these companies also owns shares in Toyota. See MacNeillLehrer Newshour, supra note 9.

11551

CONFRONTING KEIRETSU

1159

SU
111. BENEFITSAND COSTSOF THE ~ ~ % ~ Z E TSYSTEM

A. Benefits
While the United States continues to urge Japan to change
the keiretsu system:8 the Japanese refuse to be apologetic
about keiretsu and view them as a superior form of business
structure worthy of ern~lation.'~Indeed, many advantages
exist in the keiretsu system.
One of the most often cited advantages of the keiretsu
system is that it allows member companies to plan on a longterm basis, rather than having to focus on short-term profits.
This advantage is well illustrated by the relationship between
Sumitomo Bank and Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC), both
member companies in the Sumitomo keiretsu.
When NEC needs to raise investment capital, it will rely
on direct external financing from Sumitomo Bank, which owns
shares in NEC. Unlike individual stockholders, Sumitomo
Bank, as a corporate stockholder, is "willing to accept low rates
of return on investment (ROI) as long as the real value (as
distinct from par value) of equity shares appreciate^.'"^ Consequently, because U.S. companies tend to rely on internal financing to raise capital, NEC is under less pressure than most
U.S. companies to adopt strategies yielding high short-term
profits. This decreased pressure results fkom Sumitomo Bank's
policy of putting less pressure on NEC to pay out large dividends if such dividends might lead to NEC's default on the
loan. This cross-holding of stock "by corporations willing to
accept low ROI give[s] Japanese companies some degree of
insulation from imperatives of equity market^,"^' allowing
them to plow back a higher portion of retained earnings into
research and development, marketing, and other investments
that provide continuous growth.32
I n addition, when the economy is sluggish, "Sumitomo

28.

See Loosen Khiretsu Structures: US Urges Japan at SZZ Talks, MAINICHI

DAILYNEWS, May 23, 1991, available in Nikkei Database [hereinafter Loosen
WKLY.,July 20, 1991, at 3.
Structures]; Reform Keiretsu. Mosbacher Urges, NIKKEI
29.
Anthony Rowley, Defending Japan Inc., FAR E. ECON.REV.,Dec. 27, 1990,
at 44,
30.
31.
32.
54.

44.
OKIMOTO,supra note 7 , at 137.
Id.
Okimoto, supra note 24, at 48; Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, at
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Bank is often willing to refinance old loans or extend new
ones."33 This affords NEC the luxury of continuing growth
strategies even during difEcult economic times. As rebuffed
corporate raider T. Boone Pickens wrote, this aspect of the
keiretsu system "reinforces Japan's stable business environment, providing corporate managers with the time and capital
to plan for the long term."34
Of course, Sumitomo Bank also benefits from this practice.
It requires NEC to fully disclose "information concerning company operations, cooperate when business is good, and, if necessary, accept some infringement of autonomy in allowing the
bank the right to send its own people into key management
position^."^^ NEC, however, regards this as a small price to
pay for the luxury of a continual source of financing.
An advantage of the keiretsu system that was much publicized during T. Boone Pickens's futile attempt to gain a seat on
Koito'sS6 board of directors is that keiretsu member companies
are much less vulnerable to hostile takeovers and leveraged
buyouts.37 Two factors provide this protection. First, if a
keiretsu fears that one of its member companies may be taken
over, it can deliberately shieldS8 itself by raising "mutual
shareholding[s] to fight off potential takeover attempts."3g Second, keiretsu member companies, the big shareholders, never
sell their interests because their investments are "for business
reasons and capital gains."40
Another benefit of the keiretsu system is that it "encourage [ ~ ]the exchange of information and technology.'"' This is
because keiretsu provide "a ready-made network for information gathering, sharing, and policy deliberations" which "cut[s]
across industrial se~tors.'"~Although foreign businesses often
33.
OKIMOTO,
supra note 7, at 137.
34.
Kinsley, supm note 6, at 4.
OKIMOTO,supra note 7, at 137.
35.
36.
Koito is a supplier in the Toyota keiretsu. See supra note 27.
37.
It is noteworthy that after Pickens sold his shares of Koito stock, Tetsuya
Tsukatani, the former chairman of components maker Ichikoh, renewed his effort
to smash the keiretsu system. Ichikoh is a supplier company in the Nissan keiretsu,
and Tsukatani claims he was fired from his own company by a board of directors
controlled by Nissan. See Anthony Rowley, Whistle Blower, FAR E. ECON.REV.,
May 23, 1991, at 65.
38.
See Okimoto, supra note 24, at 48.
39.
Smith, supra note 13, at 54.
40.
Rapoport, supra note 12, at 77.
41.
Rowley, supra note 29, at 44.
42.
Okimoto, supra note 24, at 47.
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complain that this sharing is a form of unfair collusion, the
Japanese government has yet to address these complaints.
The keiretsu system also provides the Japanese government easy "access points" for government intervention, though
such action is rarely needed.43The leaders of the keiretsu companies often work closely with the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) and other government ministries."
A comparison of the Chrysler and Mazda bailouts illustrates
this point. The Chrysler bailout required heavy U.S. government intercession, but the Mazda bailout was "handled by the
Sumitomo . . . group, especially Sumitomo Bank, and [Mazda's]
subcontractors and distributor^."^^
Finally, the keiretsu system assures the member companies
both a constant supply source and a constant market. The
remarks of a Japanese auto executive in America illustrate this
supply source preference system: "First choice is a keiretsu
company, second is a Japanese supplier, [and] third is a local
[U.S.] company."46This policy means suppliers can always sell
their goods to the manufacturers and manufacturers have a
continual supply source. However, this attitude is also the
main reason the United States government and businesses are
calling for the dismantling of the keiretsu system.

B. Costs
Despite the benefits, keiretsu also have several disadvantages. Companies within the keiretsu face the costs of 'lower
profit margins for member firms, the dangers of oligopolistic
~~
severe are the
collusion, and wasteful d ~ p l i c a t i o n . " More
costs to the Japanese consumer who pays more for both domestic and imported goods. Still another cost is the trade friction
created by the keiretsu's exclusionary practices, often within
the keiretsu's distribution system.
Keiretsu involve many costs for the member companies.
Keiretsu are organized to spread the costs of business among
the member companies. Their profit margins can be lower than
43.
OKIMOTO,supra note 7, at 149-52.
44.
Rapoport, supra note 12, at 84. "Even if MITI wanted to be confrontational,
it would be hard to confront an industry chock-full of ex-MITI officials. The system
of amakuduri, literally 'descent from heaven,' sends scores of MITI officers, retired
at a vigorous 55, to Japanese industry each year." Id.
45.
OKIMOTO,supra note 7, at 139.
46.
Rapoport, supra note 12, at 80 (italics added).
47.
Okimoto, supra note 24, at 47.
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they otherwise would be for a highly profitable company within
the keiretsu because they must devote capital to other less profitable member companies.
Another problem, according to T. Boone Pickens, is that
supplier companies often "become captives" of the keiretsu."
For example, when the main company in the keiretsu decides to
cut costs, it often forces its supplier companies to sell their
goods at a lower profit, and sometimes at a loss. Because these
supplier companies rely so heavily on the main company for
orders, they have no choice but to comply.
As noted, opportunities for collusion are built into the
system. This means that problems such as price fixing are
common.49This drawback is compounded by Japan's soft, and
loosely enforced, antitrust laws."
Keiretsu also pose a problem of misallocation of resources.
This happens when a member company has excess plant capacity a s a result of each keiretsu's desire to have a member company represented in all major industries. This leads to "pressures to overproduce during recessions and to export surplus
production in order to climb out of re~essions."~'
Keiretsu often cause increased costs to consumers. Imports
cost more because keiretsu deny foreign firms access to their
national distribution system. Accordingly, foreign producers
have daculty selling their goods in Japan. The American
automobile industry is a n excellent example of this problem.
American car manufacturers who wish to sell cars in Japan
encounter difficulty in finding a dealership willing to sell American cars.52 According to Tamiya Tezuka, a car dealer at Tokyo Nissan Auto Sales, "Japanese auto manufacturers and the
dealers are very closely tied to each other in capital ownership,

48.
Kinsley, supra note 6, at 4.
See OKIMOTO, supra note 7, at 140.
49.
See Rapoport, supra note 12, a t 76. "[Tlhe Japanese don't really believe in
50.
antitrust. Enforcement is lax. Everyday business practices . . . ignore the gospel
according to the Sherman and Clayton [Alcts." Id.
51.
OKIMOTO,
supra note 7, a t 141.
52.
According to Richard Johnson, president of General Motors, Japan, "[wlhen
the Japanese companies went to the United States, the whole dealer organization
was opened up to them." I T S . , Japan to Form New Forum to Boost U.S. Car Sales
in Japan, INT'L BUS.DAILY(BNA), July 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAITD File [hereinafter Boost Car Sales]. Where the Japanese had an
advantage coming into the U.S. market, the Americans have a disadvantage trying
to penetrate the Japanese market.
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and it's next to impossible to sell a car from a different compan~."~'
Another reason for high consumer costs is that many
cheaper imports never reach the Japanese market. Through
their exclusionary buying practices, keiretsu keep less expensive foreign parts and goods out of Japan." This is also true
of goods produced in Japan by newer companies that are not
part of a keiretsu. Without a buyer, these companies soon wither and die.
The final disadvantage of keiretsu is the international
trade friction they create. According to Charles Dallara, U.S.
Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Affairs, "the
amount of foreign investment in Japan is only 10 percent of the
level of foreign investments in the U.S. and less than one fifth
of the level in most other industrialized c ~ u n t r i e s . "Predict~~
ably, this discrepancy creates friction with other countries and
is largely due to the keiretsu system's exclusionary nature.
IV. POSSIBLE
APPROACHES
A. Government Intervention
The U.S. government can adopt two different strategies in
regard to Japan's keiretsu system: attack it or imitate it. Either
strategy will likely irritate the Japanese, if not tactfully done,
and neither strategy guarantees success. The following, however, are several possible alternatives the U.S. government might
pursue within these two strategies.
1. Attack on the keiretsu system

The U.S. government could attack the keiretsu system in at
least four ways: through antitrust laws, retail sales regulations,
taxes, and corporate rules. Each of these approaches involves
pressuring the Japanese government to adopt new laws or to
enforce existing laws.
First, antitrust laws could dismantle the keiretsu system.
Japan's current antitrust laws were largely enacted by the
occupation forces after the w a r 5 9 h e purpose of these laws
was to dismantle the zaibatsu, or huge industrial holding corn53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
See MacNeillLehrer Newshour, supra note 9 .
Loosen Structures, supra note 28.
See Rapoport, supra note 12, at 76.

1164 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992
panies, which fueled the imperialistic war machine. Initially,
these laws were successful. However, when the occupation
forces left Japan, enforcement of the antitrust laws relaxed and
the zaibatsu companies once again formed business affiliations
in the more loosely structured keiretsu.57 To this day, the antitrust laws remain on the books, but are generally unenforceds8 because "the Japanese don't really believe in antitrust."59 However, if the United States and European governments band together and demand that Japan enforce its antitrust laws, the keiretsu system as it now operates would need
to reform.60 With the enforcement of the current laws alone,
keiretsu companies would be forced to deal more openly and
become more loosely affiliated. This is one of the approaches
the United States took during the 1991 Structural Impediment
Initiative (SII) talks.61
A second way for the U.S. government to use antitrust
laws to attack the keiretsu system would be to extend U.S.
antitrust laws "to allow prosecution of U.S.-based subsidiaries
of Japanese companies that engage in anti-competitive trade
practices in their hone [U.S.] markets."62 Thus, without having to pressure the Japanese government, the United States
could force change on the keiretsu system. Consider, for example, the Temeco Automotive incident.
Temeco, an Illinois company, supplied exhaust systems
and shock absorbers to Mazda's U.S.-based manufacturing
plants. When Tokico Manufacturing, a member of the same
keiretsu as Mazda, set up in Kentucky, Mazda's orders for the
Tenneco-made shocks suddenly stopped.63 In such a case, the
federal government could prosecute Mazda for antitrust vioSee I n s i d the C h a r m d Circle, supra note 5, a t 54. According to Michael
57.
Gerlach, a professor of business administration at the University of California a t
Berkeley, "[tlelling [the Japanese] to dismantle the keiretsu is like telling Americans to rip up their credit cards. I t is fundamental to the way business has been
done in Japan." Rapoport, supra note 12, at 85 (italics added). This statement
would have been even more true in early postwar Japan.
58.
See Linda Sieg, Foreigners Have Doubts About Japan's Antitrust Stance,
REUTER BUS. REP., July 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT
File. T h e FTC has been called a 'toothless tiger,' unable to emerge from the shadow of the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry whose mission has
been to nurture, not restrain, industry." Id.
59.
Rapoport, supra note 12, at 76.
60.
See Rowley, supra note 29, a t 44.
61.
See Loosen Structures, supra note 28.
62.
Rapoport, supra note 12, at 84.
63.
Id. at 80.
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lations in the United States, thus punishing the Japanese company. Such a policy would put pressure on keiretsu companies
to deal fairly and openly within the United States. It might
also indirectly pressure the Japanese government to effect
changes from within JapanB4
Another means the United States could use to attack the
keiretsu system is to pressure the Japanese government to
establish stricter retail regulations. Currently, keiretsu manufacturers have so much control over retail outlets that they are
able to set any retail price at which their goods must be
sold.65Often the manufacturer prints the price on the package
which is "often inflated by 30%."66 Manufacturers are thus
able to sell at inflated profits by forcing the retailer to sell at a
certain price or offering phony discounts without cutting their
own margins. Abolition of this resale-price fixing would hurt
keiretsu manufacturers by cutting into their profits.
In retail sales the United States could also press for the
termination of "sale-or-return" arrangements that commonly
exist between Japanese manufacturers and retailers. These
arrangements provide that if goods cannot be sold a t a certain
In
price the retailer must return them to the man~facturer.~'
other words, these arrangements prohibit retailers from using
true clearance sales to move dead stock. This keeps prices artificially high and profits healthy for keiretsu companies.
A third means the United States could use to attack the
keiretsu system would be to insist on corporate tax reforms i n
Japan. Under the existing system, keiretsu companies are "allowed to write off the exorbitant sums they spend on promoting
group-wide harmony."68 Managers in Japanese companies
spend Y5 trillion ($35 billion) annually on entertai~ment.~'
Elimination of tax breaks for corporate entertainment would do
much to break up the power of the keiretsu groups. This, however, is probably an unrealistic solution because "it is difEcult
to imagine America's corporate leaders advocating a crackdown

64.
The federal government is currently investigating at least six such cases in
the United States. See id. at 84.
65. See Cheaper Shopping in Japan, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 28, 1989, at 15.
Matsushita has 27,000 wholesale and retail outlets, and Toshiba has 14,000. Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. "In clothing, for instance, 30% of the goods in shops go back to the
manufacturer unsold." Id.
68.
In,de the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, at 54.
69.
Id.
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on executive wining-and-dining, even for the Japane~e."~'
American companies enjoy this tax write-off luxury as much as
the Japanese.
The fourth possible method of attack available to the U.S.
government is to press the Japanese government to enact strict
corporate laws. Such laws could include a requirement that
keiretsu companies "list shares in their annual accounts,'"'
maintain a mandatory outside director on the board of cbrectors, "strengthen shareholder[] rights, and facilitate mergers
and acquisition^."^^
Robert Zielinski, a financial analyst at Jardine Fleming
Securities, argues that the keiretsu "system could in theory be
diluted by introducing some changes to the rules under which
banks and other holders of keiretsu shares are required to list
shares in their annual accounts."73The theory behind such a
rule is that by exposing the extensiveness of the keiretsu alliances, the system would suffer. However, the keiretsu system
has become so entrenched that this alone would probably not
be enough to dismantle or change the system.74
At the May 1991 SII talks in Tokyo, the United States
urged Japan to install outside directors on the boards of Japanese corporations t o "strengthen shareholders' rights, and [to]
facilitate mergers and acquisition^."'^ Outside directors often
sit on the boards of American companies and are "deemed to
prevent collusive deals among companies with interlocked
shareholder^."^^ A . increase in shareholder rights would ideally loosen the corporate keiretsu cross-shareholder's
stranglehold on the corporation, allowing the company more
freedom in the market. Lastly, laws facilitating mergers and
acquisitions would allow investors to buy companies that may
be potentially more profitable outside the keiretsu.
However, if the United States pushes for such changes in
Japan, the Japanese will .surely require concessions from the
7 0 . Id.
71.
Smith, supra note 13, at 54. Listing is already required, but strengthening
of the requirement is necessary.
Loosen Structures, supra note 28.
72.
73.
Smith, supra note 13, at 54.
Id. Zielinski believes "the durable keiretsu system has shown signs of
74.
strengthening over time, at least if the internal 'cohesion factor' is measured in
terms of the percentages of interlocking shareholdings of the various group members." Id.
75.
Loosen Structures, supra note 28.
76.
Id.
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Americans. At the SII talks, the Japanese pressured America
to "reduce its federal budget, enhance private savings and
'press for an international investment climate that would facilitate U.S. efforts to maintain its traditional open and nondiscriminatory investment policy.' "17 The U.S. government must,
therefore, decide if the keiretsu system is a structure it should
attempt to change o r rather one it should attempt to imitate.
2. Imitation of the keiretsu system

Lester Thurow, Dean of the Sloan School of Management
a t the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a proponent of
the keiretsu system. He outlines several steps the U.S. government should take to imitate the keiretsu system and build
Unless the government takes
American competitivene~s.~~
such steps, Thurow argues, American companies will not be
able to compete with their Japanese co~nterparts.'~
Thurow first asserts the government should "[llet groups of
companies own substantial shares in one another and put executives on one another's boards."80 Additionally, he contends
the government should "let financial. institutions own controlCurrently, the
ling shares of nonfinancial public c~mpanies."~'
largest shareholders of many American corporations are financial institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds, and
insurance companie~.~"Unle those in Japan, these financial
institutions "usually do not put their executives on boards of
directors, since this would give them inside information not
available to small shareholders. America's largest owners main-

77.
Id.
78.
Lester Thurow, Let's Learn from the Japanese, FORTIJNE,Nov. 18, 1991, a t
183 [hereinafter Thurow, Let's Learn]. For a more detailed discussion, see LESTER
THIJROw, HEADTO HEAD:THE COMINGECONOMIC
BATTLESAMONG EUROPE,JAPAN,
AND AMERICA
280-90 (1992) [hereinafter THIJROW,HEADTO HEAD].
T ~ ~ o HEAD
w , TO HEAD,supra note 78, a t 290. "In today's economic world
79.
economy, where American firms must match up against the business groups of . . .
Japan, American firms need to be able to form the same strategic alliances, the
same self-help societies, and the same joint strategies for conquering world markets." Id.
80.
Thurow, Let's Learn, supm note 78, a t 183.
81.
Id.
82.
TmJROW, HEADTO HEAD,supra note 78, a t 282. "In the aggregate, financial
institutions such as pension fimds, foundations, or mutual funds own 60 to 70
percent of most publicly listed companies." Id.
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tain an arm's-length relationship with the firms they collectively own."g3
According to Thurow, this practice of arm's-length relations
between companies prohibits large shareholders from being
"active builders who seek to strengthen a company's long-run
competitive position."84 Instead, these financial institutions
become short-term speculators trying to succeed in the takeover
wars. If "finance and industry. . . become so entwined that
their destinies cannot be ~eparated,"'~
short-term speculation
would cease and corporations could focus on long-term results
rather than on quarterly dividends.
Thurow argues that the current antitrust laws, passed in
Congress's attempt to find "a scapegoat for the Great Depression . . . should be r e m ~ v e d . " ~ ~would
h i s allow the leaders of
financial institutions to sit on boards of directors, in effect
bindmg them to the corporation for the long haul. Financial
institutions "should be encouraged to get into financial situations from which they cannot extract themselves, except by
making the corporations in which they have invested successf~1.99~~
Thurow's second suggestion is to pass laws requiring that
"those who own a dominant position in any company-say 20
percent or more-should be forced to give the public one day's
advance notice of their intention to sell any of the shares."8g
These laws would prevent dominant shareholders with representation on boards of directors from abusing inside information. If a dominant shareholder attempts to jump ship, the
day's notice requirement would give smaller, uninformed
shareholders ample time to sell their shares, driving the price

Thurow, Let's h a r n , supra note 78, at 183.
83.
Tmrrrow, HEADTO HEAD,supra note 78, at 282.
84.
85.
Id. at 287.
86.
Thurow, Let's b a r n , supra note 78, at 184. "[Ojne of the institutions that
allowed America to build its economic supremacy in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries [was] the alliance of companies interlocked through financial institutions."
Id. a t 183. An example of this was the House of Morgan, centered around the
merchant banker J. P. Morgan, with significant investments in a diverse group of
industrial companies. Because such alliances were seen as the cause of the Depression, the government passed antitrust laws to break them up. According to
Thurow, many "[h]istorians now know that factors much more fundamental than
Morgan's practice caused the Depression, but the rules prohibiting business groups
have persisted." Id. a t 184.
TmrrroW, HEADTO HEAD,supra note 78, a t 287.
87.
Id. at 289.
88.
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down for the dominant ~hareholder.~'
Conversely, if a dominant shareholder wanted t o accumulate more shares, the notice
would allow investors not privy t o the same information to buy
at the current price.
Thurow's third suggestion is to reinforce the distinction
between traders and investors by making "voting rights increase with the length of time shares are held, with full rights
attained after . . . five years."g0 This would encourage investors, especially large institutional investors, to invest with an
eye to the long term. While this would still allow the sharpshooting stock trader t o grow rich by buying and selling shares,
it would deny him "owner" status with a right to vote and
make decisions."
Last, Thurow recommends "assign[ing] voting rights to
lenders who make long-term loans to a ~ompany."'~This
would largely erase the distinction between debt and equity,
allowing institutions that provide long-term loans to companies
active strategic direction in those companies. As lender-directors, the banks' roles would be those of informed and active
lenders, rather than of the "absentee landlord" positions they
currently occ~py.'~
According to Thurow, these four changes in U.S. corporate
law would create an American industrial environment capable
of competing in the global market by putting "real capitalists
back in the driver's seat of the American corporation. Then box
them in so that they have no choice but t o improve their firms
and, hence the nation's productivity and competitiveness if they
want t o be personally successful."94Rather than force the rest
of the world-especially Japan, whose history and culture is so
different from the United States2-to follow our rules, America
can succeed by banding together and learning to play the Japanese game like the Japanese. Thus, America may be better off
by imitating the keiretsu system rather than attacking it.

B. Business Solutions
Until lawmakers change domestic laws t o weaken the

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Thurow, Let's barn, supra note
THUROW,HEADTO HEAD,supra
Thurow, Let's Learn, supra note
HEADTO HEAD, supra
TH~JRQW,
Id.

78, at 183.
note 78, at 289.
78, at 183.
note 78, at 290.
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keiretsu ties of Japanese companies within the United States,
American companies need to compete by either imitating the
keiretsu system or forming alliances with Japanese companies
already in established keiretsu. Companies entering the Japanese market have found a t least two noteworthy means to beat
the keiretsu system: operating specialized stores and retailing
through their own networks. These two techniques have proved
successful for several companies operating in Japan.
Over the last five years, specialized clothing stores in Japan, while lowering prices, have managed to double their market share.g5 This is partly due to revisions in Japan's Large
Scale Retail Store Law of 1974, which allow for 'large-scale"
stores to open with fewer restrictions than before? Specialized clothing stores in particular have succeeded by moving
more clothes a t lower costs than competing keiretsu retail distributors. These specialized stores do this -by cutting handling
costs, especially because unsold goods are not-returned to the
wholesaler. By selling only a single line of goods, focusing on
the weekend customer, and hiring more part-time employees
than traditional keiretsu controlled retail stores, specialized
stores have found a profitable niche in the Japanese marketeg7
American companies wishing to succeed in Japan may find this
a viable alternative to competing within the keiretsu dominated
system.
American companies can also compete in Japan by creating
their own distribution networks. Amway and Tupperware have
done this successfully in Japan much like they have in the
United States. Both of these companies distribute and sell
products largely through a home sales network. This works
especially well in Japan where many women still have difficulty working outside the home. These women provide an excellent work force, distribution network, and customer base.
"Eastman Kodak, which has sales of more than $1 billion a
year in Japan, is putting together its own mini-keiretsu. Kodak
has acquired a number of its distributors and has taken small

95.
Charles Smith, Wholesale Killers, FAR E. ECON.REV.,Jan. 17, 1991, at 45,
45. "So-called 'roadside' stores in city suburbs, which buy directly from manufacturers, now account for 10% of the Y3.6 trillion (US$26.5 billion) men's clothing
market." Id.
96.
See Charles Smith, Reforms in Store, FAR E. ECON.REV.,Jan. 17, 1991, at
44, 44. "Large stores" are defmed as having more than 500 square meters of floor
space. Id.
97.
See Smith, supra note 95, at 45.
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stakes in some 50 suppliers and customer^.'^^ Although this
may not be a feasible way for all companies to enter the Japanese market, it is one way to compete successfully in the
keiretsu dominated distribution system.
With the increasing number of Japanese companies setting
up shop in America, many companies with no interest in entering the foreign arena are finding it necessary to compete with
the keiretsu system.99 MIT's Charles Ferguson bluntly states:
"When a n opponent or a competitor is using a particularly
strong and distasteful tactic, you may have to use it too."'00
Examples of American companies joining together in
keiretsu-fashion to become more competitive are the recent IBM
joint ventureslo' involving Apple computers (once a key rival), S e i m e n ~ , ' ~
Lang
~
Labs,lo3 Sears,lo4 and Diebold.lo5
Together, these companies are more capable of competing in
the international market. In fact, Yoshi Tsurumi, a professor a t
Baruch College in Tokyo, asserts that such alliances are long
overdue and that "American companies will be doomed unless
they really just start forming their own international as well as
domestic alliances."lo6 For Americans like Lynn Williams, former U.S. Trade Negotiator who feels the Japanese "have to
play along with t h e r e s t of us,"'07 this is not very palatable
alternative. lo'
Although probably more difficult, another alternative is for
American companies to try to become part of the Japanese

Rapoport, supra note 12, a t 85. Albert Sieg, former head of Kodak Japan
98.
said, "To the Japanese, the keiretsu is a very comfortable way of business." Id.
A study by the University of Michigan suggests that as much as "90% of
99.
the parts in Japanese cars built in America come either direct from Japan or from
Japanese manufacturers which have set up shop in the United States." Ins& the
Charmed Circle, supra note 5, a t 54. Even Honda, the most aggressive about using
locally procured parts, only uses about one-third American-made parts. Boost Car
Sales, supra note 52.
100. MacNeil l k h r e r Newshour, supra note 9.
101. Id.
102.
Seimens is a German firm and the joint product is in the field of semiconductors. Id.
103. The Lang Labs joint venture involves imaging. Id.
104. The Sears venture involves personal computer software. Id.
105. The Diebold venture is for automated teller machines. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. Williams insists, "Anyone who says that a Keiretsu system is good is
looking a t it from the standpoint of a taker, somebody who's benefiting from it.
Those who are outside the system do not benefit from i t a t all and can compete
with it only in their Keiretsu system." Id. (italics added).
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keiretsu web. This, however, has proven difficult as Japanese
companies prefer to keep business to themselves. Even when
inclined to let foreigners into their alliances, the Japanese are
more apt to choose European companies over American partners. log

Keiretsu present a serious challenge to American business.
Because of their many benefits, the Japanese are not likely to
abandon keiretsu unless the U.S. government applies serious
pressure. However, this may not be in America's best interest.
American government and business must develop an alternative approach. Imitation of the keiretsu system, coupled with
reforms in federal corporate law, may be the only workable
choice for the United States.
Jonathan E. Johnson 111

109.

See Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 5 , at 54.

